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Designed for Workarounds:  
A Qualitative Investigation into the Causes of Operational Failures in Hospitals 
 
Abstract: Frontline staff in hospitals can spend at least 10% of their time working around 
operational failures. However, scholars know little about the underlying causes of the failures 
and therefore have limited guidance on reducing operational failures. To address this research 
gap, we conducted a qualitative study of the sources of operational failures on two hospitals’ 
nursing units.  Our supporting evidence came from in-depth observations and interviews with 
employees from four nursing units and the support departments that provided materials needed 
for patient care.  We find that nearly half (49%) of the 120 failures we observed were from 
violations of Spear and Bowen’s (1999) design rules.  In addition, a third of the failures were 
from issues not explicitly discussed in Spear and Bowen’s framework.  These breakdowns 
reflected low levels of internal integration (1) among departments and (2) between the work of 
supply departments and the needs of current patients.  In short, the “supply-to-stock” supply 
departments were unable to meet the needs of the “supply-to-order” nursing work.  This 
explanation contrasts with employees’ perception that failures were caused other workers’ errors, 
dilatoriness or incompetence.  Our study thus suggests that applying Spear and Bowen’s rules for 
work design and increasing the levels of internal integration of supply departments to the needs 
of their internal and end customers should reduce a majority of operational failures experienced 
by frontline service staff.   
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to reduce the frequency with which operational failures occur in 
hospitals by developing a deeper understanding of their underlying causes.  Hospitals face a 
pressing need to improve efficiency, quality of care and patient experience (Berwick et al. 2006). 
Yet, many hospitals struggle to achieve these goals (Wachter 2010). A contributing factor to 
poor performance is that frontline care providers have to repeatedly work around operational 
failures to provide care, which wastes caregiver time, delays care, and contributes to safety 
problems (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003, de Leval et al. 2000, Gurses and Carayon 2007, Hall et al. 
2010, Hendrich et al. 2008, Tucker 2004).  Thus, a critical step in improving the performance of 
hospitals is to mitigate operational failures by identifying and addressing their underlying causes. 
Operational failures are instances of missing or insufficient supplies, equipment, information 
and people to complete a work task (Tucker 2004). Prior research has primarily focused on 
categorizing the types of operational failures encountered by workers and quantifying their 
impact on outcomes.  However, few studies have examined their underlying causes (Fredendall 
et al. 2009).  This is an important omission because without an understanding of what contributes 
to operational failures, it will be challenging to reduce their frequency.   
This paper helps close this gap by conducting a qualitative investigation of the causes of 
operational failures experienced by hospital nurses on medical/surgical wards. The authors, 
together with a team of 25 other people, conducted 112 hours of direct observation of medical/ 
surgical nurses in two hospitals, documenting 120 operational failures that were directly 
observed. To understand the causes of these failures, the authors and team members also 
shadowed employees from the ancillary support departments that provided materials, 
medications, and equipment needed for patient care.   3 
 
We used a grounded, inductive reasoning approach, which investigates a research question 
through iterative cycles of analyzing the qualitative data to allow patterns to emerge from the 
observations (Miles and Huberman 1994).  We then compared what was learned to existing 
theories to discover which theories best reflect the underlying dynamics that were observed 
(Shah et al. 2008).  Our methods are similar to those used by Fredendall et al (2009) and Shah et 
al. (2008).  A difference between our study and those two studies is that we examined internal 
supply chains (ISC) across multiple departments within the same hospital, while Fredendall 
studied operational failures within a single department (perioperative surgical service 
department) and Shah studied the interorganizational supply chain across multiple independent 
organizations.  We find that Spear & Bowen’s (SB) (1999) theory of effective work design was 
useful for describing what we had observed to be the causes of operational failures.  This theory 
was applied as an organizing framework after the observations were conducted and therefore 
represents a post hoc method for structuring our results (Shah et al. 2008). 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on improvement in service organizations by 
providing additional insight about the underlying causes of operational failures in hospitals.  
First, we find that nearly half of the operational failures could be attributed to violations of SB’s 
four rules about work design. To our knowledge, scant research has empirically quantified the 
link between violations of SB’s design rules and operational failures.  Second, we find that a 
third of the failures resulted from factors not explicitly stated in SB’s rules. These factors related 
to low levels of internal integration among the departments in the ISC with each other and with 
patients’ specific needs.  Most prior research has examined the impact of internal integration on 
organizational level performance, such as the speed of new product development (Flynn et al. 
2010), financial performance (Dröge et al. 2004), and cycle time (Shah et al. 2008).  Our study 4 
 
extends this research stream by providing specific examples of how low levels of internal 
integration in the work routines of upstream supply departments inadvertently contribute to 
operational failures and workarounds experienced by frontline employees.   
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Operational failures 
Many researchers have documented the existence of operational failures, referring to them as 
performance obstacles (Gurses and Carayon 2007), hassles (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003), 
blockages (Rathert et al. 2012) and situational constraints (Peters and O'Connor 1980, Villanova 
and Roman 1993). In this paper, we will refer to them as operational failures or problems. The 
primary focus of prior research has been on describing and quantifying the different types of 
operational failures experienced by workers.  For example, categories of problems include ones 
related to information, tools and equipment, materials and supplies, budgetary support, help from 
others, and work environment aspects, such as lighting (Gilboa et al. 2008, Klein and Kim 1998, 
McNeese-Smith 2001, Peters and O'Connor 1980, Peters et al. 1985, Villanova 1996).  Scholars 
have also quantified the negative impact of operational failures on organizational outcomes, such 
as productivity (Gilboa et al. 2008, Peters and O'Connor 1980, Peters et al. 1985).  Operational 
failures have been shown to have a moderate impact on employee performance. For example, a 
meta-analysis of seven different kinds of work-related stressors—which, in addition to 
operational failures, included work-family conflict and job insecurity—found that operational 
failures had the largest correlation ( -0.29) with job performance (Gilboa et al. 2008).  More 
specifically related to our study, research on hospital nurses have found that approximately 10% 
of nurses’ time is spent working around operational failures (Hendrich et al. 2008, Tucker 2004).  5 
 
Studies have shown that operational failures can occur in ongoing, everyday work, 
particularly when the work is complex and requires inputs from multiple different departments 
within the organization, such as healthcare (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003, Gurses and Carayon 
2007, Hendrich et al. 2008, Tucker 2004).  They also result from the introduction of new 
equipment (von Hippel and Tyre 1993) or information technology (IT) systems (Ash et al. 2004, 
Halbesleben et al. 2010, Koppel et al. 2008).  Changes in production technology can introduce 
obstacles for employees, either through deliberate work blockages created for safety reasons, or 
through inadvertent disconnects between how the IT system is designed and how work is 
actually performed (Ash et al. 2004, Halbesleben et al. 2010, Koppel et al. 2008).  
A common response to operational failures is to work around them (Halbesleben et al. 2008, 
Kobayashi et al. 2005, Rathert et al. 2012, Spear and Schmidhofer 2005). Halbesleben et al. 
(2010) define a workaround as “a situation in which an employee devises an alternate work 
procedure to address a block in the flow of his or her work” (p.1).  In the short term, 
workarounds are beneficial because they enable work to continue. However, if the employee 
does not expend additional effort to prevent recurrence, information that could be used to 
identify and remove underlying causes of the failure is lost, allowing operational failures to 
persist (Tucker and Edmondson 2003).  
Operational failures and workarounds negatively affect organizations, employees, and 
customers.  First, they erode employee productivity because of the additional time required to 
work around problems. This is particularly problematic situation for hospitals where nurses 
experience frequent operations failures because nursing labor is often hospitals’ largest expense 
(Spear 2005, Tucker 2004).  Furthermore, having to continually work around problems burns out 
employees and contributes to dissatisfaction and turnover (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003).  Finally, 6 
 
operational failures delay care and can lead to errors that harm customers (Halbesleben et al. 
2008, Jimmerson et al. 2005, Spear and Schmidhofer 2005). 
Despite these negative effects, we know relatively little about the underlying causes of 
operational failures and what actions might mitigate the causes (Fredendall et al. 2009).  We now 
describe the few studies that have examined specific contributors to operational failures.  
Fredendall et al (2009) found that a lack of standardization in the preparation of surgical trays led 
to equipment errors that were discovered during surgery.  Bendoly and Hur’s (2007) study 
demonstrated that chronic missing supplies on one hospital’s nursing units were due to 
understaffing in the department responsible for stocking the supplies (“central supply”).   
These studies collectively suggest that operational failures result from breakdowns in the 
transfer of materials or information from one internal department (e.g. surgical services, central 
supply) to another (nurses and surgeons).  The physical movement of materials through the 
organization from receiving to the point-of-use has been described as an ISC (Basnet 2012, 
Fredendall et al. 2009, Halbesleben et al. 2010, Pagell 2004, Shah and Singh 2001, Swinehart 
and Smith 2005). More precisely, an ISC is defined as the set of processes that provide customer-
facing employees with the materials, information, equipment, and human resources that they 
need to provide service to customers (Fredendall et al. 2009, Halbesleben et al. 2010, Pagell 
2004, Shah and Singh 2001, Swinehart and Smith 2005).  In hospitals, the resources required for 
patient care also include medications.  For brevity, we refer to these items as “materials.” 
Materials flow through departments as they travel through the organization to be used in patient 
care (Vera and Kuntz 2007).  Breakdowns in the flow of materials result in operational failures 
when nurses do not have materials needed for patient care.   7 
 
To provide a specific example of ISCs in hospitals and how breakdowns could lead to 
operational failures, let us consider the ISC for medications (Halbesleben et al. 2010), which is 
shown in Figure 1. A physician uses a computerized physician order entry system to order a 
medication for a patient. This system relays the order to the pharmacy, where a pharmacist 
verifies the order and dispenses the medication. The medication may be delivered to the nursing 
unit by a pharmacy technician, who places the medication in one of several locations: a 
refrigerator, a drawer designated for the patient, or an automated dispensing device. Engineering 
is responsible for maintaining the refrigerator, while information technology (IT) is accountable 
for the computers and software used to order and dispense medications. Alternatively, the 
medication may be sent through a pneumatic tube system, which is dependent on engineering. A 
nurse administers the medication to the patient, and may need supplies to do so, such as syringes, 
which the central supply department stocks on the unit or a piece of equipment, such as a pump, 
which is maintained by biomedical equipment and cleaned by the sterile processing department. 
In addition, the nurse also may need to administer the medication with food, which dietary 
services supplies. In summary, the process of getting medications to patients involves nine 
departments, which are represented as circles in Figure 1: medical staff, pharmacy, nursing, 
engineering, central supplies, dietary, information technology, biomedical equipment, and sterile 
processing.  An operational failure can occur in any of the steps and failures can be caused by a 
variety of factors including human error, delay, equipment malfunction, or miscommunication.  
It is often unclear to the nurse exactly why the operational failure occurred and where in the 
chain the breakdown was from.   
 
---------- Insert Figure 1 about here ---------- 8 
 
2.2. .Design of Internal Supply Chain 
The lean literature on ISC design is related to the sources of operational failures because 
effective process design for supplying workers with the required materials and equipment should 
prevent operational failures from occurring in the first place.  In particular, we use Spear and 
Bowen’s (SB’s) (1999) framework of Toyota’s process design rules.  Their study can be viewed 
as an investigation of the design rules of an organization with highly functioning ISCs. Although 
SB’s purpose was to discover the essence of Toyota’s production system, we extend their rules to 
health care as a starting point for describing the causes of operational failures in hospitals. Our 
supposition is that violating these work design rules will result in operational failures in 
hospitals.  We selected SB’s framework to use an organizing mechanism for reporting our 
findings after we conducted our observations and analyses because we found that their four rules 
mirrored the structure of our results.  We now describe their rules and link them to failures. 
The first rule concerns the design of the activities in an individual’s work routine. SB (1999) 
state that activities should be clearly specified so that the employee knows exactly what to do, in 
what order, at what time, and if the work was done correctly. If this design rule is broken, 
employees may complete work incorrectly or with high levels of variability, which can lead to 
problems.  For example, in a study of operating rooms, Fredendall et al. (2009) found that 
variability in the equipment that surgeons requested as well as variability in how technicians 
executed their tasks caused mistakes in the preparation of surgical equipment trays. In addition, 
other research suggests that consistent execution of routines may increase resilience to errors by 
reducing the amount of mental capacity that employees need to devote to work, freeing up 
capacity for anticipating and preventing problems (Gittell 2002). 9 
 
The second rule concerns the connections between internal customers and suppliers, which 
states that the process of requesting supplies should be highly specified and include details such 
as what is being requested, how much, and at what location. The connection must be direct 
between a specific customer and a specific supplier (rather than a pool of people), without any 
intermediaries, and include a yes-or-no response to each request so that the customer knows that 
the request was received and when to expect delivery (Spear and Bowen 1999). Specified 
connections prevent operational failures for several reasons. First, having a direct relationship 
between an internal customer and the supplier can improve communication and understanding 
between the two groups, which can pre-empt problems and aid in solution if they arise.  For 
example, Gittell (2002) found that relational coordination—a team of employees from 
interdependent functions with shared goals and respectful working ties—fosters informal 
communication that helps the team successfully adjust to changing conditions.  Second, 
receiving a yes/no response to one’s request for material along with expected delivery time and 
location prevents having to repeatedly look to see whether the requested material has been 
delivered. In addition, should the material fail to appear, the person would know whether the 
delay was because the request was not received (in which case the person would not have 
received a response from the supply department) or because the department was just slow in 
responding (in which case the person would have received an acknowledgement of the request).  
Without this system of responding to requests, if the material is slow in arriving, the internal 
customer is likely to repeat the request, which creates confusion for the supplier as to whether 
there are two separate requests or only one request, repeated twice.   
Third, Spear and Bowen (1999) state that the pathway of materials as they move through the 
organization to frontline employees must be simple and direct.  In other words, materials must 10 
 
flow from and to specific people, rather than to the next available person or machine. A direct 
pathway is beneficial because it ensures traceability in the flow of materials, which is helpful for 
problem solving, and it enables workers to efficiently locate requested materials. Otherwise, 
employees may have to search in multiple storage locations for requested material.    
The final rule specifies how improvement should be conducted. Improvement activities are 
performed at the lowest possible organizational level, under the guidance of an experienced 
person.  Furthermore, improvement initiatives should be conducted as experiments, such that 
hypotheses are proposed and tested (Spear and Bowen 1999).  This approach to resolving 
problems ensures that solutions to problems are implementable and have the desired impact, 
which should reduce future occurrences.   
3. Methods 
We conducted our study at two hospitals operated by an integrated healthcare organization with a 
total of 36 hospitals. We selected these hospitals because they were supported by our 
geographically-based grant.  Data was gathered from October to December 2011 using multiple 
methods including surveys, direct observation and interviews.  
We created multiple data sets to investigate the causes of operational failures.  First, at the 
start of the research project, we surveyed eight department managers at the two hospitals about 
their existing performance metrics. We asked them to list the metrics that they used to gauge 
their department’s performance on timeliness, quality, and cost. We also asked them to list the 
metrics they used to gauge how well their department met the needs of their internal customers 
and patients.  Furthermore, we asked how much transparency they had about how their 
department’s performance impacted patient care delivery on the hospital units.  11 
 
In addition to these surveys, together with the larger team of 25 people, the authors observed 
employees as they worked in medical/surgical nursing units and in the departments that provided 
the materials, medications, equipment, food, and general support services needed for patient 
care. The team conducted a total of 66 observations over 112 hours.  Thirty of these hours were 
spent observing support departments while the remainder was spent on nursing care. 
Observations consisted of shadowing participants while they did their job along with having 
open-ended conversations to understand the reasons behind each action. The team observed for 
two hours at a stretch, two times per day, for three or four days at each hospital. Our sample 
consisted of a variety of professionals, including nurses, nurses’ aides, assistant nurse managers, 
charge nurses, unit assistants, pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, engineers, central supply 
technicians, biomedical engineers, dietary and IT staff.  Study participants were offered an 
opportunity to refuse participation, although none did.   
On average, 5.7 of 25 team members observed at a given time.  Having a team enabled us to 
simultaneously observe several people within the same nursing unit as well as support 
department personnel.  The individuals who helped us with the observations included support 
department managers and front-line employees from the two hospitals, nurse managers from the 
nursing units we observed, and staff nurses.  All observers collected qualitative data in a 
different hospital from the one in which they worked.  The authors standardized the observation 
process by instructing observers how to conduct an observation. Observers took notes on blank 
paper and then summarized what they had discovered using “contact summary sheets” (Miles 
and Huberman 1994).  The sheet had space to record the person’s position, any observed 
operational failures, the causes of these failures (if known), what actions were taken in response, 
and the amount of time spent on the failure. These sheets were one of our primary data sources. 12 
 
After each two-hour observation block, the team members who had conducted observations 
gathered together to provide a verbal report of their observations.  They reported on who was 
observed, what his or her role was, and the key incidents that were directly observed (Gilmore 
2002, IDEO 2011, Lin et al. 2011). Verbally describing key events from all of the different 
observers’ perspectives allowed a more complete understanding of events to emerge. For 
example, one nurse might have done an activity (e.g. tampering with a computer to make it 
appear broken so that no one else would take it away from her), which resulted in a different 
nurse encountering an operational failure.  As this example illustrates, having a group discussion 
enabled different perspectives of the same incident to surface, which provided a deeper 
understanding of the causes of operational failures.  The debrief discussions were recorded and 
transcribed, replacing real names with pseudonyms. The debrief transcripts supplemented 
information from the contact summary sheets. 
In addition to the observations, the authors interviewed managers and staff from all nine 
departments involved in the ISC. We conducted interviews of either one or two people at a time 
and asked about the challenges they faced, how departments coordinated their work and how 
work requests were transmitted across boundaries.  The interviews were recorded and transcribed 
as well. Table 1 provides details on the number of people who participated in observations, 
interviews and their departments.  
 
---------- Insert Table 1 about here---------- 
 
After gathering the observation and interview data, the authors conducted qualitative 
analysis, which involved multiple iterations of collectively distilling and connecting the 13 
 
information gathered from the various observations and interviews (IDEO 2011). Our goal was 
to develop a conceptual framework that explained the causes of operational failures (Miles and 
Huberman 1994).  We first used the contact summary sheets to create a database of the 
operational failures that were directly observed, which became our primary data and informed 
our qualitative analysis.  To increase our understanding to the causes and consequences of the 
problems in this dataset, we read the debrief transcripts with particular focus on extracting 
information that was directly related to the operational failures that we had observed.  We used a 
grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Miles and Huberman 1994, Strauss and Corbin 
1998) to distilling (“coding”) our qualitative data.  Coding was a crucial step process because it 
enabled us to focus on the important aspects of the observations without experiencing data 
overload (Miles and Huberman 1994).  To enable all of the authors to have a grounded 
understanding of the operational failures, we divided the transcripts among us and all extracted 
information.  Before doing this, however, we established inter-rater reliability by having all 
authors code the same transcript. We then compared which sentences we had individually 
highlighted as important.  Our inter-rater reliability was .72 (kappa), which indicated substantial 
agreement (Landis and Koch 1977). This high inter-rater reliability provided confidence that we 
could divide the transcripts among us to identify and extract key passages.  We then succinctly 
summarized the main issue from each passage onto a single sticky note. This resulted in 680 
notes, which formed the initial building blocks that we used to create our framework. 
Over the course of eight workdays, we used a structured process to convert the qualitative 
data that had been extracted onto the 680 sticky notes into a coherent framework.  First, we 
clustered notes that had the same or similar information (e.g. all of the sticky notes that 
mentioned an operational failure due to a computer being out of batteries were grouped 14 
 
together).  We then engaged in pattern coding to create a higher-level classification of how the 
events related to each other (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Miles and Huberman 1994, Strauss and 
Corbin 1998).  
To illustrate the process, we had multiple sticky notes related to computers. The computers 
were on wheels and were to be shared by all the care providers working in a unit.  We began by 
placing all of the sticky notes related to computers in a cluster.  They described the various 
situations related to computers that we had observed, such as a nurse having to walk a long way 
to find an available electrical outlet to plug the computer in; and a nurse having to try three 
different computers before finding a working one.  Other sticky notes described how nurses 
engaged in hoarding behaviors, such as placing ownership signs on computers (e.g. “Mary’s 
computer”).  To generate a deeper, collective understand of the causes of operational failures 
related to computers, we combined related codes into “meta” themes (e.g. hoarding and sabotage 
were collapsed into one category) and allowed new categories to emerge (e.g. defensive 
behaviors) (Miles and Huberman 1994). We then organized the higher level categories to depict 
relationships among them.  For example, we had a cluster of sticky notes describing the 
nonresponsive computer repair process and another cluster describing the lack of available 
electrical outlets.  We linked these clusters to the shortage of working computers, which in turn 
lead to defensive behaviors.  In summary, by combining all the pieces of the computer story 
gathered across multiple observations together, we strove to create a cohesive set of insights that 
summarized the causes of operational failures related to computers.   
After establishing an initial set of insights, we compared our results to existing literature 
relevant to operational failures.  We found that our framework had similarities with SB’s four 
rules (1999) because the causes could be categorized as being related to activities, connections, 15 
 
pathways, and improvement activities. Therefore, the authors coded the causes of the 120 
failures using SB’s four rules.  Within each of these four broad categories, we created 
subcategories derived from the specifics of SB’s rules, as well from our initial set of insights.  
We also had an “other” category for failures that did not fit the categories. First, the authors 
individually coded each failure in the dataset, which could be coded with multiple causes. We 
then discussed the coding of each failure until we reached an agreement on the codes to apply.   
 
4. Results 
While shadowing nurses, we directly observed 120 operational failures.  On average, a nurse 
experienced one failure every 37 minutes and working around them consumed 12% of their day. 
These results are similar to prior research on operational failures, lending credibility to our data 
(Hendrich et al. 2008, Tucker 2004).  As shown in Table 2, 36% of the operational failures were 
related to work activities, 20% to connections between internal and external suppliers, 14% to 
the flow of materials and services along pathways, 12% to improvement, and the remaining 18% 
were “other” issues, such as insufficient training or software glitches.   
A second way to report the causes of failures is to divide them into whether or not their 
causes could be mapped onto SB’s four rules.  We discovered that 49% of the failures we 
observed were caused by violations explicitly mentioned by SB. However, 34% stemmed from 
low levels of internal integration in a manner not described by SB (1999).  The remaining 18% 
remained in the “other” category. 
We define internal integration as the extent to which separate departments within an 
organization efficiently work together to meet end customers’ needs (Kahn and Mentzer 1998, 
O'Leary-Kelly and Flores 2002, Pagell 2004).  For our study, two aspects of internal integration 16 
 
were particularly salient: the extent to which internal supply departments’ activities were 
designed to satisfy the current end customer’s specific needs, and the extent to which internal 
supply departments effectively coordinated their activities such that the customer-facing 
department had the supplies and equipment needed at the right time to provide service.  
We assert that the distinctive features of healthcare delivery: the large variability and 
continually evolving nature of end customer demand as well as the highly technical, specialized 
knowledge of functional areas—create the need for high levels of internal integration. Without 
internal integration, operational failures occur, which the care givers then work around.  
Therefore, hospitals may need to augment SB’s design rules with practices specifically designed 
to address their environment.  Below, we describe each of the four categories of causes 
(activities, connections, pathway, and improvement), providing detail on operational failures 
resulting from violations of SB’s rules, as well as associated conditions that stemmed from low 
internal integration not described by SB’s rules.  
3.1 Activities 
Within the activity category, as SB’s framework predicts, failures were caused by a lack of 
standard procedures and criteria for assessing the accuracy of actions.  This is similar to 
Fredendall’s finding (2009) about how unstandardized processes resulted in missing surgical 
equipment.  In our dataset the largest cause of failures (13% of all failures) was because an 
individual neglected to do an activity that he or she should have done.  In one instance, a hungry 
patient could not get a meal tray because his physician had not entered a dietary order.  
However, we found that even when an internal supplier’s activities complied with SB’s 
activity rule of work being highly specified, the downstream internal customer could nonetheless 
experience an operational failure if the supplier’s activities were not performed to meet specific 17 
 
needs of the patient. This lack of integration of internal suppliers’ activities with end customers’ 
needs accounted for 6% of all failures.  The work of the sterile processing department employees 
provides an example. Nurses put used intravenous pumps in the dirty utility room, which the 
sterile processing department then cleaned and placed in the clean utility room. The sterile 
processing department technician’s cleaning and restocking of intravenous pumps—although 
performed in accordance with their department’s process—often did not meet the needs of 
current patients because the department’s work was driven by the pump usage of discharged 
patients rather than by the needs of current patients.  For example, we observed a specific type of 
pump (triple) that was needed by a patient, but was unavailable in the clean utility room. The 
technician had done his job of cleaning dirty pumps and restocking them on the unit, however, 
the work did not match patients’ needs.  In summary, we found that operational failures were 
caused by the combination of highly variable end customer needs and supply departments that 
“supplied-to-stock” rather than tailoring delivery to meet the specific needs of patients. 
3.2 Connections 
Five percent of failures were due to violations of SB’s rule that connections must (1) be clear 
in terms of how requests are made and (2) provide feedback to the requestor that the request was 
received and what the expected delivery time is.  In addition, another 5% of the failures stemmed 
from insufficient restocking requests by internal customers when the supply was running low. 
Our observations suggested that this occurred because there was no easy, automatic way to re-
order materials that were running low. For example, we observed nurses use the last of a 
particular item on the unit (e.g. ice cream) without notifying the internal supplier to restock that 
item. As a result, the next nurse who needed the item would find an empty shelf.  There was a 18 
 
clear way (phone call) for the nurses to make a request to restock an item as specified by SB, but 
we did not observe anyone do this.   
The most frequent connection-related cause (8% of problems overall) was not specifically 
represented by SB’s connection rule. These failures stemmed from a lack of internal integration 
as manifested by deficient knowledge transfer between internal suppliers and internal customers. 
Although the customer-supplier connection was specified, direct, and included a yes/no signal 
for communication, there were instances when the internal customer lacked enough knowledge 
to continue processing the material efficiently.  For example, we observed a nurse search 
unsuccessfully for over an hour for two bags of IV medication that she needed for her patient, 
despite the fact the pharmacy had confirmed they had been delivered to the unit. The nurse did 
not realize that due to the amount of a certain type of medication in the bags, the bags were 
placed in the medication refrigerator, the one place out of eight possible storage locations where 
the nurse had not looked.  In this instance, the supplier-customer connection was direct and had a 
clear yes/no response (and there was a designated storage location per rule 3), but the connection 
was inefficient because knowledge of the algorithm for determining the storage location was not 
communicated to the nurse. Prior research has similarly found that essential knowledge is often 
not transferred across discipline boundaries because it is so central to one discipline’s work that 
they do not realize that other disciplines do not possess it (Carlile 2002, Carlile 2004, Kellogg et 
al. 2006, Malone and Crowston 1990, Orlikowski 2002).  
3.3 Pathways 
With regard to pathways, violations of Spear and Bowen’s (1999) rule that pathways must be 
pre-specified and direct with no forks or loops accounted for 6% of all failures. For example, 19 
 
many materials on units did not have a single, designated storage location, and thus nurses had to 
look in multiple places to find items.   
In addition to the SB-related causes, we found that the most frequent cause related to 
pathways (8% overall) was due to poor handoffs of materials between departments. Specifically, 
although pathways were direct and specified, some did not facilitate successful handoffs of 
materials from one step in the process to the next.  This happened when multiple departments 
were responsible for taking action to process the material, with the specific department 
responsibility dictated by the particular circumstances.  As a result of the variability in 
responsibility, materials stalled mid process because each department thought that it was the 
responsibility of another department to process the material. We refer to an inadequate handoff 
as “a gap in the process.” Gaps occurred at the interface between departments and were 
frequently related to equipment repair and cleaning.  To illustrate, we describe the gap in the 
process for IV poles.  If a patient who had an IV pole was discharged from a room, the 
environmental services (EVS) department would clean the pole and leave it in the room.  Thus, 
the next patient to be placed in that room would have an IV pole available. However, if the 
discharged patient did not have a pole, then EVS would clean the room, but would not find a 
clean IV pole for the next incoming patient.  Under these conditions, nurses were supposed to 
find an IV pole for the new patient.  As a result of the ambiguity about whether or not a clean IV 
pole should be in a newly cleaned room; and who was responsible for IV poles, nurses frequently 
discovered when the new patient arrived to his room that there was no IV pole, and then she had 
to scramble to try to find one.  
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The fourth category was related to improvement processes. SB’s improvement rule stipulates 
that changes to the activities, connections, and pathways within an ISC should be conducted by 
the scientific method, namely by postulating a hypothesis and testing it to see if it had the desired 
impact. An implicit assumption of this rule is that improvement activities take place, but they are 
not effective. We found instead that improvement activities were not even occurring despite the 
frequent operational failures we observed.  Although problems were not directly caused by 
violations of the improvement rule, a lack of awareness and motivation to resolve them enabled 
failures to persist.  Thus, as a precursor to SB’s rule, it appears that triggers for improvement 
efforts are needed.  In the hospitals we studied, for example, there were no methods or systems, 
such as meetings between the supply departments and the nursing units, which exposed failures 
and enabled discussion of potential solutions.  The hospital did not use tools to understand delays 
in the flow of materials through the organization, such as the supplier-inputs-process-outputs-
customers (SIPOC) tool advocated by six-sigma proponents (Anil et al. 2004).  In addition, there 
were few measures of system-wide performance. To provide evidence of the lack of triggers for 
improvement efforts, we surveyed department managers on their department’s performance 
metrics.  As Table 3 shows, of the departments surveyed, only nursing had a majority of metrics 
(60%) that measured the overall hospital system’s ability to meet end customers’ needs. The 
support departments’ metrics were predominantly measuring their own department’s 
performance. For example, all of the pharmacy’s metrics evaluated their own performance, such 
as the average time to verify an order, rather than tracking their performance in the big picture of 
overall system performance. As a result, departments could think they performed well on 
department-level measurements, such as meeting department delivery time and labor-cost 21 
 
targets, but remain unaware of their organization’s poor performance on system-level measures, 
such as the overall timeliness of medication administration to patients.  
 
---------- Insert Table 2 about here ---------- 
---------- Insert Table 3 about here ---------- 
 
3.5 Employees’ Responses to and Beliefs about Operational Failures 
We now describe the dynamics caused by operational failures. Nurses compensated for the 
lack of reliability in the supply of materials to the units by hoarding functional items.  Forty-four 
percent of the nurses whom we interviewed stated that the equipment needed to do their job was 
often unavailable and that it was an accepted practice to “go shopping” in the dirty utility room, 
in other patients’ rooms, or on other units. For example, one nurse said, “If you can’t find it, you 
go get it, no matter where it is.” We also observed nurses violate policy by personally claiming 
shared equipment for their entire shift by putting notes (e.g. “Mary’s computer”) on computers 
so that other care providers—who also needed to use the equipment to do their jobs—would feel 
social pressure not to use these items.  More drastically, we observed nurses make functioning 
equipment appear broken.  For example, one observer saw a computer-savvy nurse rotate the text 
display on a shared-use computer by 90 degrees to discourage other people from using it. A 
second observer’s nurse attempted to use this computer, but abandoned it due to the rotated 
screen text.  These hoarding behaviors exacerbated the shortage of functional equipment, which 
contributed to the number of operational failures. 
With regard to employees’ beliefs about the causes of operational failures, we found that 
employees attributed problems to deficient individuals in other departments. We spoke with 22 
 
employees from all nine departments involved in the ISC, and everyone expressed satisfaction 
with their own department’s work. No one in the support departments expressed the belief that 
their department’s routines could be changed in a way that would improve overall ISC 
performance. Thus, people seemed unaware of the low levels of internal integration and its 
contribution to operational failures. When reflecting on operational failures, people attributed 
poor performance to shortcomings of workers in other departments rather than to suboptimal 
design of activities, connections, pathways, and improvement processes. For example, a sterile 
processing worker attributed poor performance to a general lack of training in the organization, 
stating, “I don’t know why our organization doesn’t care about training.” This attribution to 
individuals created an impediment to improvement because people did not recognize the 
opportunity to work collaboratively across boundaries to improve organizational work systems.    
 
4. Propositions about Integrated Internal Processes  
We propose that the more the activities, connections, pathways, and improvement processes of 
internal supply departments are integrated across departments and with the needs of current 
customers, the lower the frequency of operational failures experienced by the customer-facing 
employees.  We predict that operational failures occur at the interface where a supply department 
“supplies-to-stock” for a department that in turn has to provide “make-to-order” services.  
Furthermore, operational failures will be more frequent when there is greater variability in the 
materials and equipment needed by the end customers.  In the hospital setting, these conditions 
equate to nursing units with short lengths of stay and high variability in patient diagnoses, such 
as medical/surgical units. We therefore predict that medical/surgical units will experience more 
operational failures than specialized, long-term care units, such as bone marrow transplant units.  23 
 
This is because stocking a standard set of materials on a unit with highly fluctuating patient 
diagnoses is unlikely to satisfy actual customer demand, given the day-to-day variability in what 
supplies are needed and the storage space limitations of most units.  Furthermore, because nurses 
are responsible for delivering care to their patients, they compensate for unreliable supply 
systems by working around the problem.  In other words, although the failures result from a lack 
of internal integration, the deficiency manifests as workarounds.   
 
5. Discussion 
This study examined the causes of operational failures in the medical/surgical units at two 
hospitals.  We found that nearly half of the failures we observed could be categorized as 
violations of Spear and Bowen’s (1999) work design rules.  However, a third stemmed from a 
lack of internal integration of departments with each other and with current customers’ needs.  
Departments emphasized their own performance, and thus processes were designed to maximize 
departmental efficiency rather than timeliness of service delivery to end customers. Nurses, in 
turn, compensated for the poorly integrated supply systems by working around the failures 
because they were in the unique position of having both the clinical knowledge to translate 
patients’ orders into resource needs and the responsibility for providing patient care.   
We found that the hospitals had low levels of internal integration, in part, because of how the 
supply departments were designed and managed.  Supply department activities were not always 
performed to meet current patients’ needs, knowledge was not transferred across department 
boundaries, and pathways had gaps, all of which stalled the delivery of materials. Lastly, there 
was no forum for continuously improving the ISC.    24 
 
When there are low levels of internal integration, supply departments are unable to reliably 
deliver what current customers need due to the high levels of variability in end customer needs 
(Anderson et al. 2005).  An implication of our finding is that operational failures in hospitals 
result from a system design that is low on internal integration rather than from other reasons 
hypothesized by the employees we interviewed, such as poor motivation, a lack of training, or 
human error. Thus, to reduce operational failures, hospital managers need to redesign ISCs so 
they can be more responsive to end customers’ needs and so that handoffs of materials from 
department to department are more efficient.  Furthermore, there must be a greater level of 
communication and collaboration between the various departments involved in the ISC instead 
of merely monitoring and rewarding performance at the department level, which may 
inadvertently result in a situation where supply departments appear productive, but customer-
facing employees encounter frequent failures. 
5.1. Implications for Research 
Our research joins the stream of operations-based literature examining ISC in service 
organizations (Eisenstein and Iyer 1996, Fredendall et al. 2009, Halbesleben et al. 2010, Shah 
and Singh 2001, Swinehart and Smith 2005).  In particular, we contribute to the literature on ISC 
integration by applying Spear and Bowen’s (1999) framework to hospitals to discover the causes 
of operational failures.  Similar to Pagell’s (2004) study of ISC integration, we highlight the 
importance of measurement and cross-departmental communication. However, as Fredendall et 
al. (2009) point out, Pagell’s framework is not a precise fit for the hospital setting because the 
clinical licensing requirements makes it difficult to use job rotation and cross functional teams to 
drive communication across departments.  Our study instead highlights the importance of 
process design and collaboration across ISC departments as a mechanism for high performance.  25 
 
Our study builds on Fredendall et al.’s (2009) by finding that operational failures can occur even 
when employees correctly follow standardized work routines. For optimal performance in this 
setting, routines across departments need to be connected with one another and to end customer 
needs, and there needs to be unambiguous assignment of responsibility for material processing.   
Several literatures are pertinent to our findings about the causes of operational failures and 
the solution of increasing internal integration in the ISCs of hospitals. The importance of having 
ISC-level measures of performance is analogous to aligned incentives in the supply chain 
literature (Lee 2004, Narayanan and Raman 2004) and shared goals for relational coordination 
(Gittell 2002, Gittell et al. 2000).  The need for shared goals between marketing and 
manufacturing to align conflicting objectives between these two departments has been well 
studied (Pagell 2004), but to our knowledge, fewer studies have examined the impact of a lack of 
system measures for supply departments within a service organization. This is an important 
contribution because unlike marketing and manufacturing, which arguably have different goals 
(sell more product versus manufacture at low cost), and therefore have competing objectives, the 
departments in a linearly-flowing ISC are arguably more similar and are tasked with the joint 
responsibility for providing required equipment and materials to the patient.  
Deliberate knowledge transfer across department boundaries is a key aspect of the literatures 
on organizational knowledge (Carlile 2002, Carlile 2004, Kellogg et al. 2006, Malone and 
Crowston 1990, Orlikowski 2002) and relational coordination (Gittell 2002, Gittell et al. 2000).  
We contribute to the scant research on knowledge transfer across different communities of 
practice within organizations (Bechky 2003, Carlile 2002).  Prior research has found knowledge 
transfer challenges in new product development teams (Carlile 2002, Iansiti and Clark 1994) and 
custom production of manufacturing equipment (Bechky 2003). We build on this research by 26 
 
showing that problems with knowledge transfer also apply to routine work of service 
organizations. Similarly, Gittell (2000) has researched coordination among clinical disciplines, 
but she has primarily considered the clinical work of developing plans of care for patients.  
Although this is an important part of the work of a hospital, it is an incomplete representation 
because it does not consider the interaction between non-clinical departments and clinical 
workers.  Thus, our work extends Gittell’s studies (2000, 2002) by examining coordination 
among non-clinical support departments and nursing units.   
5.2.  Implications for Practice 
Our study has lessons for managers of service organizations.  Workarounds occurred at the 
interface between a support department that used predetermined “routines” (Adler 1995) to drive 
its work tasks and a customer-facing department that used “practice” (Faraj 2006) for customized 
patient care.  The support departments insulated themselves from end-customer demand, 
artificially creating a low level of uncertainty in their tasks.  However, because of the high level 
of uncertainty in patients’ conditions, nurses had to use practice, which is an unfolding set of 
tasks (rather than a predetermined list) that emerge in real time as one attempts to achieve an end 
goal (Faraj 2006).  To avoid workarounds, managers should create a method for customer-facing 
employees to request and receive customer-specific supplies in a timely fashion from routine-
driven support departments.  One method of accomplishing this would be to have an assigned 
customer support person for a specific department who provides frequent restocking of the unit.   
In addition, managers need to create an organizational focus on ISC-level design and 
performance.  Employees are unlikely to recognize systemic causes of workarounds because they 
often blame poor performance on other people’s shortcomings rather than on poor work-system 
design (Institute of Medicine 2001). Similarly, uninformed managers might not recognize the 27 
 
need for a system-level focus because their department may be meeting departmental-level goals 
and have hard-working employees who execute tasks successfully. Unfortunately, these are false 
feedback mechanisms which can mask poor system-level performance.  Our research builds on 
other operations management studies that found that managers’ uninformed intuition about work 
systems can lead to suboptimal decisions (White et al. 2011).  Our paper contributes to the body 
of operations management lessons for white collar work (Hopp et al. 2009, Hyer et al. 2009).   
5.3.  Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has several limitations. First, we use qualitative data to draw descriptive conclusions. 
These constraints limit our ability to formally test relationships among constructs and 
performance measures. The development of a set of standard measures of integration to end 
customer needs would enable researchers to test our framework’s impact on performance. 
Furthermore, we collected data from only four units in two hospitals, limiting the generalizability 
of our study. Examining more hospitals, as well as other service industries, would strengthen our 
conclusions and the overall applicability of our framework.  An important question for future 
research is what specific measures organizations can take to improve integration of their ISCs. 
Longitudinal research testing could specify which dimensions impact improvement in 
performance over time. A related extension would be the development and testing of 
interventions to improve integration. By testing whether various interventions have the 
anticipated positive impact on performance measures, researchers could more accurately gauge 
the value of specific practices to create more integrated environments.  Finally, we leave it to 
future research to test whether workarounds occur more frequently at interfaces between routine-
driven and practice-driven departments within ISCs than at interfaces where both departments’ 
work is driven by the needs of the end customers.    28 
 
5.4. Conclusions 
The design and operation of ISCs represent important drivers of efficiency, job satisfaction, and 
quality, but are understudied in service organizations. By better leveraging the competencies of 
the different communities of practices responsible for delivering customer service, organizations 
can reduce operational failures, freeing up employees’ time to provide service.  Achieving the 
goal of reducing operational failures will require an explicit emphasis on integrating the routines 
of the different departments within organizations to meet the needs of end customers.  
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Figure 1. Internal Supply Chain for Medications in the Two Hospitals 
 
 
Circles = Departments responsible for the process step or equipment, materials, or information. 
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Table 1.  Details from Research Phase: Observations and Interviews 
   Observations  Interviews  Observations and Interviews 
Perspective  Hosp.1  Hosp. 2  Total  
Total 
Hours  Hosp. 1  Hosp. 2  Total 
Total 
Hours 
Total No. of 
Observations and 
Interviews 
Total Hours of 
Observations and 
Interviews 
Physician  0  1  1  2  0  1  1  0.7  2  2.7 
Pharmacy  2  1  3  4  0  0  0  0  3  4.0 
RN  21  27  48  82.3  12  4  16  7.2  64  89.4 
Engineer  1  0  1  2  0  0  0  0  1  2.0 
Central 
supplies  1  0  1  2  0  0  0  0  1  2.0 
Nutrition  1  1  2  4  0  0  0  0  2  4.0 
CPED  1  1  2  4  0  1  1  0.3  3  4.3 
Biomed  1  1  2  2.7  0  0  0  0  2  2.7 
EVS  4  2  6  9.2  1  0  1  0.3  7  9.6 
IT  0  0  0  0  3  0  3  0.3  3  0.3 
Total  32  34  66  112.2  16  6  22  8.7  88  120.9 
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Table 2.  Categorization of the Sources of Operational Failures into Activities, Connections, Pathway and Improvement (N=120 problems) 
Category  Example problem  Number  Pct. of 
category 
Pct. of 
total 
problems 
Work Activities         
Work not done, done 
incorrectly or against 
policy 
Patient arrives on unit after lunch time and needs a lunch tray, but 
has no dietary order from physician for food. Nurse calls 
physician to request that he put an order in the computer system. 
22  37%  13% 
Space, equipment insufficient  Computers on wheels are plugged into the electrical outlets in 
front of the sink area because that is the only place where outlets 
are. Nurse has to push computers out of the way every time she 
washes her hands. (Two nurses observed, n=2) 
19  32%  11% 
Work not customized for end 
customer needs 
Patient’s medications require a triple pump to administer them, 
but there was no triple pump in the clean or dirty utility room. 
10  17%  6% 
Conflicting orders  Patient requested she be authorized to purchase a hospital bed for 
when she was discharged home. Physician approved, but the 
medical equipment approver did not.  Nurse has to resolve the 
inconsistency. 
6  10%  4% 
Work design/routine leads to 
problems  
Change in policy requires nurse to have patient sign the discharge 
instructions, and them make a photo copy for the patient to keep. 
Photocopier is far from the patient room, resulting in inefficient 
process (long walk back and forth from copier to patient room).  
3  5%  2% 
Total     60    36% 
Connections         
Transfer of knowledge between 
internal supplier and 
internal customer 
Nurse looked in four different locations for bags of IV medication.  
She called the pharmacy, who told her they “had been delivered”, 
but the nurse never found them. Due to the amount of Lidocaine in 
the IV bags, they were in the medication refrigerator, in 
compliance with a storage rule known by pharmacy, but not by 
the nurse.  
13  38%  8% 
No trigger to request work by 
internal supplier 
The linen cart was out of pants (and none had been ordered).   8  24%  5% 
Problem with timing of 
connection (too slow, or 
request interrupts work) 
Nurse was interrupted by another nurse who asked her a 
question while she was preparing medications, despite the 
fact that the nurse was wearing a ‘do not interrupt’ 
medication sash 
8  24%  5% 34 
 
Status or work request 
unknown or difficult to 
contact the supplier 
Nurse needed to get a hold of the patient’s physician, but her 
pager number was not in the list of physicians and their 
phone numbers.  
3  9%  2% 
Lack of IT compatibility   Nurse called the laboratory to tell them about the lab test for 
the patient even though it was already in the main computer 
system because the laboratory is on a different IT system and 
can’t see the laboratory orders in the main system. 
2  6%  1% 
Total     34    20% 
Pathways         
Gap in the process of getting 
materials through the 
organization 
There are not enough functioning computers on the unit, they 
take a long time to reboot, and run out of batteries if not 
plugged in but there are few outlets on the unit. The nurse 
went to use a computer, but the display image had been 
rotated by 90 degrees by another nurse to prevent others 
from taking “her” computer.  
14  58%  8% 
No designated storage 
locations  
Had to look around for a flashlight because there is no 
designated storage location for flashlights. 
10  42%  6% 
Total     24    14% 
Improvement         
No meetings between ISC 
departments 
There were not enough working vital sign monitors.   12  60%  7% 
No measures of overall system 
performance 
Scanners, which are maintained by the IT department, are 
not working, delaying medication administration by the 
nurses. 
8  40%  5% 
Total     20    12% 
Other         
Equipment failure  Bed rail broke. Bar code scanner was not working.    18  60%  11% 
IT software problems  Unit assistant unable to process patient’s admission because 
more than one physician was writing a discharge in IT system 
5  17%  3% 
Interruption of work  Nurse was documenting her care of her patient when she was 
interrupted to help another nurse pull her patient up in bed. 
5  17%  3% 
Insufficient training  The nurse didn’t know the weight requirement for patients to 
be included in a bariatric study. 
2  7%  1% 
Total     30    18% 
*Does not sum to 120 problems because problems could receive multiple codes 
Italics = Not explicitly mentioned by Spear and Bowen’s (1999) rules 35 
 
Table 3. Level of Analysis of Department Performance Measures as Reported by Department Managers 
Department  Timeliness  Quality  Cost  Internal 
Satisfaction 
Patient 
satisfaction 
Information 
about impact  % process level 
Dietary 
Completed work 
within time 
frame 
Taste of food  Cost of meals  None 
Rating on food 
and courtesy of 
employees 
Too little  40% 
Pharmacy 
Average time to 
verify a 
medication order 
Accuracy of 
order verification 
Pharmacy-level 
inventory, 
equipment, labor 
costs 
Average time to 
verify a 
medication order 
None  Too little  0% 
Environmental 
Services (EVS) 
Average time to 
clean a 
discharged room 
Adherence to 
standard cleaning 
procedure 
EVS labor 
expenses versus 
budget. 
% of rooms 
cleaned within 
time limits 
Patient 
satisfaction with 
room cleanliness 
Depts. should 
accurately enter 
when a bed is 
ready for patient 
discharge 
20% 
Materials 
Management  None 
Number of open 
orders to be 
filled 
Materials-
management's 
expenses versus 
budgeted 
None  None  Limited insight  20% 
Nursing 
% of patients 
transferred from 
ED to floor in 
two hours.  Time 
from written 
discharge until 
patient is out the 
door. 
Difference 
between 
scheduled 
medication 
administration 
time versus 
actual. Patient 
falls, Patient 
satisfaction. 
Nursing unit's 
expenses versus 
budgeted for 
materials, 
equipment, labor. 
Nursing staff 
satisfaction with 
job environment. 
Patient 
satisfaction with 
nurse 
communication 
and 
responsiveness. 
limited information 
about how nursing 
actions impacts 
other departments' 
performance. We 
hear about our 
[negative] impact 
on EVS, but no 
hard data. 
60% 
Sterile 
Processing  None  Documented 
complaints  None  None  Not applicable  No comments  0% 
Biomedical 
Time to respond 
to individual 
problem 
None  None 
Annual survey 
internal cust. 
satisfaction 
Not applicable  Equipment records 
are on line  20% 
Engineering 
Timeliness to 
respond to repair 
request 
Repeat calls 
about the same 
problem 
None  Repeat calls  Not applicable  Little information  40% 
Italics= Process-level measure; normal font = Department-level measure 